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This  paper  examines  whether  globalization  causes  the  loss  of  monetary-policy 
independence in developing economies.  By using India as a case study we find that 
globalization does not necessarily cause the loss of monetary-policy independence.  A 
country with foreign exchange constraints may lose its monetary-policy independence 
even in the absence of globalization under limited capital flows as long as it attempts to 
maintain a fixed or a stable exchange rate.  This was the case in the 1960s when India 
controlled capital flows, maintained a fixed exchange rate, and Indian interest rates used 
to  follow  US  interest  rates  in a  significant  way.    In  contrast, a  country  can  exercise 
monetary-policy  independence  even  under  free  capital  flows  as  long  as  it  does  not 
maintain a stable exchange rate.  Thus, monetary-policy independence is anchored in the 
nature of the exchange-rate regime along with the state of foreign-exchange constraint, 
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Introduction 
 
Globalization  is  usually  thought  to  be  responsible  for  the  loss  of  monetary-policy 
independence  in  developing  economies  like  India,  which  substantially  opened  capital 
flows in the 1990s.  This belief is ingrained in both theory and empirics.  For example, as 
predicted by the Mundell-Fleming model, when the exchange rate is fixed, capital flows 
will equalize domestic and international interest rates, with monetary policy losing its 
ability to influence domestic activity.
1  Obstfeld and Taylor (2003), and Obstfeld et al 
(2003) have reinforced this idea in their theories of the macroeconomic policy trilemma 
or  the  impossible  trinity  argument.    The  argument  ascertains  the  impossibility  of 
maintaining free capital flows, a stable or a fixed exchange rate, and an independent 
monetary policy in a simultaneous fashion.  
 
These arguments are again grounded in the interest rate parity. Some countries like India 
welcomes free capital inflows in one hand, and maintains a stable exchange rate in other 
hand. Consequently, the country is left with no choice but to closely track the interest rate 
of the leading economies, which the capital is flowing from. This situation essentially 
raises  a  question:  Does  globalization  invariably  cause  the  loss  of  monetary-policy 
independence in developing economies?  This paper attempts to answer this question. 
 
Capital-market  liberalization  has  created  controversies  in  recent  years.  Stiglitz  (2002, 
2004) shows that capital-market liberalization has often led to increased instability, not to 
economic growth in developing countries. Stiglitz claims that the economic crises of the 
late 1990s and early years of the new millennium were partly or even largely attributable 
to capital-market liberalization. However, Stiglitz does not directly address the debate 
over monetary-policy independence and capital-market liberalization.  Our work can fill 
out  the  gap  in  this  regard.  Mohanty  and  Scatigna  (2004)  argue  that  when  countries 
maintain  capital  account  restrictions,  central  banks  may  retain  control  over  monetary 
policy even with a fixed exchange rate.  We will examine this argument by involving an 
empirical exercise with Indian data. 
 
To preview, we find that globalization does not necessarily cause the loss of monetary-
policy independence. A country with foreign exchange constraints may lose its monetary-
policy independence even in the absence of globalization under limited capital flows as 
long as it attempts to maintain a fixed or a stable exchange rate.  In contrast, a country 
can exercise monetary-policy independence even under free capital flows as long as it 
does not maintain a stable exchange rate. Thus, monetary-policy independence is more 
anchored in the very nature of the exchange-rate regime along with the state of foreign- 
exchange constraint, and not necessarily in globalization per se. 
 
This paper comprises five sections.  Section I defines globalization and monetary-policy 
independence. The theoretical approach to monetary-policy independence across different 
exchange-rate regimes is presented in section II. Section III describes Indian exchange-
rate regimes, monetary-policy tools, evolution of capital flows, and the background of 
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globalization  in  India.  Section  IV  builds hypotheses  about  the  relationship  of  India’s 
interest  rates  with  the  US  counterpart  based  on  Indian  exchange-rate  regimes.  And 
section V concludes. 
 
Defining Globalization and Monetary-Policy Independence 
 
Globalization  refers  to  the  increasing  worldwide  integration  of  markets  for  goods, 
services and capital. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace defines globalization 
as  a  process  of  interaction  and  integration  among  the  people,  companies,  and 
governments of different nations, a process driven by international trade and investment 
and  aided  by  information  technology
2.    To  make  matters  simple,  here  we  define 
globalization as free flows of capital across countries.   
 
Monetary-policy independence, on the other hand, refers to a situation where the central 
bank or the monetary authority of a country can handle their monetary tools without any 
significant influence of its foreign counterpart.  In a two-country model of our exercise 
we use the US case as the leading economy, and India as an example of a developing 
economy.  We know that the Fed funds rate is the leading monetary instrument for the 
US.  We take the call money rate as India’s interest rate.  In section III, we will explain 
why we take the call money rate to represent the stance of India’s monetary policy. 
 
If the Fed funds rate, and henceforth the Fed rate cannot explain the movements in the 
Indian call money rate, and henceforth the call rate, the Indian central bank is assumed to 
have exercised monetary-policy independence. In contrast, if the Fed rate can explain a 
significant portion of India’s money call rate, we can claim that Indian authorities have 
substantially lost its monetary-policy independence. Now we want to present a theoretical 
interpretation  that  describes  the  link  between  monetary-policy  independence  and 
exchange-rate regimes.  
 
Theoretical Approach to Monetary-Policy Independence  
 
Here we discuss a theoretical model that describes the co-movement of the interest rate 
between two countries under different exchange-rate regimes of the developing economy. 
We assume that the rest-of-the-world (ROW) forms the leading country and thus enabling 
us to have a standard two-country model of capital flows. The Keynesian open economy 
model that incorporates capital mobility and the exchange rate is our approach in this 
respect.  Thus,  perfect  or  imperfect  capital  mobility  along  with  a  fixed  or  floating 
exchange rate creates four different cases in theory. We will mainly focus on imperfect as 
well as perfect capital mobility under a fixed or a stable exchange rate. To make matters 
simple, we assume a fixed price level for both countries.  As a result, expected inflation 
equals zero.  The equation of aggregate expenditure can be framed as: 
 
(i)   0 , 1 0 , 0 , 0 , ) , , , ( 1 > < < < < + =
ROW Y Y r ROW E and E E E e Y Y r E Y e e  
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where Y is actual output, E is planned expenditure, r is the interest rate, and e is 
the  exchange  rate.  The  amount  of  foreign  currency  required  to  purchase  one  unit  of 
domestic currency defines the exchange rate.  e1 is the error term of white noise.  Er, Ee , 
EY, and 
ROW Y E denote the partial derivatives of E(·).  The balance-of-payment equation as 
composed of capital flows, net exports, and reserve gain can be framed as below: 
         (ii) 
0 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 ) ( , 0 ) , , ( ) ( 2
* ³ > < < > · ¢ = + - + - RG and NX NX NX F C e RG Y Y NX r r CF
ROW Y Y ROW e e  
where  CF  denotes  capitals  flows,  r  is  the  domestic  interest  rate,  r
*  is  foreign 
interest rate, NX means net exports, RG denotes reserve gain, and e2 is the error term of 
white noise.  The simple way to model imperfect capital mobility is to assume that capital 
flows depend on the interest-rate differential (IRD) of domestic and foreign interest rates, 
as denoted by r and r
*, respectively. Any domestic interest rate higher than its foreign 
counterpart  will  cause  capital  inflows,  and  vice  versa.  NXe,  NXY,  and 
ROW Y NX are  the 
partial  derivatives  of  NX(·).  We  need  to  redefine  capital  flows  as  all  of  capital  and 
financial flows other than the purchases and sales of foreign currency by the central bank 
(CB), and to define the reserve gain as the difference between the CB’s purchases and 
sales of foreign currency. Now constraining reserve gain with non-negativity condition 
imposes a floor on domestic interest rate, which we denote as  r . The function can be 
stated as: 
   (iii)   0 , 0 , 0 ), , , ( *
* > > > = r Y ROW r and r r r Y r r
ROW e e    
   where 
ROW Y r , 
ROW Y r , and  * r r  are the partial derivatives of  ). (· r   When the CB’s 
desired interest rate would cause it to lose reserves, it must set an interest rate above its 
desired rate in order to preserve the exchange rate if the CB wants to keep it fixed. The 
CB is free to set a high interest rate, but it faces a limit to its ability to lower interest rates 
in comparison to its foreign counterpart.  r  is the interest rate that leads reserve gain to 
zero, and the CB cannot go below that. Any interest rate above that will ensure a reserve 
gain. However, raising interest rates is not domestically desirable. As a result, the CB has 
better incentives to follow the foreign interest rates. Thus, fixing exchange rates along 
with a non-negativity condition on reserve gain constrains monetary policy even with 
imperfect capital mobility. 
 
Under perfect capital mobility and a fixed or a stable exchange rate, the domestic interest 
rate closely tracks its foreign counterpart in order to maintain a steady or fixed exchange 
rate, because the Interest Rate Parity suggests:      








+1 *  
where Et is the current exchange rate, and Et+1 is the forward exchange rate. If 
authorities attempt to ensure Et = Et+1, it implies r = r
*. As r
* is given, the domestic 
interest rate must follow its foreign counterpart in a synchronized fashion.  This parity is 
linked to the idea of the impossible trinity proposition, or the macroeconomic policy 
trilemma  (Obstfeld  and  Taylor,  2003,  Obstfeld  et  al,  2003),  which  ascertains  the 
impossibility of maintaining free capital flows, a stable or fixed exchange rate, and an 
independent monetary policy in a simultaneous fashion.  International Conference on Globalization and Its Discontents, Cortland, 2007 
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Indeed, if capital is highly mobile, it becomes impossible to separate monetary policy and 
exchange rate policy (Joshi and Little, 1994). When the capital account is liberalized, the 
capacity of monetary policy to influence nominal interest rates for domestic purposes and 
resist  exchange  rate  movements  simultaneously  is  significantly  eroded.  As  capital 
movements are freed, short-term interest rates will increasingly be determined by the 
covered interest parity condition, thus constraining the capacity of authorities to assign 
monetary and exchange rate policies to different macroeconomic objectives (Kohli 2005). 
 
The theoretical approach lends credence to the loss of monetary-policy  independence 
under  free  capital  flows  when  the  country  attempts  to  stabilize  its  exchange  rate. 
However, the theoretical approach also shows that a country even without free capital 
flows may lose its monetary-policy independence as long as it attempts to ensure non-
negative  reserve  gain  as  well  as  a  fixed  exchange  rate  simultaneously.  We  will 
empirically examine the theoretical results in the next section.  
 
An Empirical Exercise with Indian Data 
 
In this section we want to undertake empirical exercise with Indian data and examine 
monetary-policy independence across different exchange-rate regimes. Accordingly, we 
need  to  see  how  Indian  exchange-rate  regimes  evolved  over  time,  and  how  Indian 
authorities used monetary-policy tools. A picture of capital mobility is presented in this 
section as well. In addition, we want to preview the background of globalization in India. 
 
Indian Exchange-Rate Regimes: 
 
India  underwent  different  exchange-rate  regimes  since  independence.  Figure  1  shows 
India’s exchange rate on a monthly basis starting in April 1960.
3 The exchange rate is 
defined as the amount of the US dollar per unit of the Indian rupee. India’s different 
exchange-rate regimes since 1960 are apparent in the figure. Post-independence India 
was under the Bretton Woods system where the US government undertook to convert the 
US dollar freely into gold. Other member countries of the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) agreed to fix the parities of their currencies vis-à-vis the dollar with variation of 
1% on either side of the central parity being permissible.  The Indian rupee was pegged to 
the British sterling, which implies that it was pegged to the US dollar as well under the 
Bretton  Woods  system.  While  the  country  faced  a  severe  inflation  and  balance  of 
payments  crisis  in  the  mid  1960s,  the  rupee  was  devalued  in  1966  along  with  some 
import liberalization. After the breakdown of the Bretton Woods in August 1971, the 
country  temporarily  maintained  its  tie  with  the  US  dollar  till  December  1971. 
Subsequently, the rupee was pegged to the pound sterling until September 1975.   
 
After September 1975, Indian authorities moved to a policy, which was a float in essence. 
It  was,  however,  politically  unacceptable  to  call  it  a  ‘float’,  because  float-driven 
devaluation was strongly unpopular in India.  Indian officials rather described the regime 
as a ‘peg to a basket of currencies with undisclosed weights’. As Joshi and Little (1994) 
argue, “The peg to a basket of currencies in 1975 helped to accustom the public and the 
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politicians to frequent exchange rate changes against the intervention currency. It began 
to be used as a smoke screen behind which the exchange rate could be devalued”. Indian 
authorities did not attempt to maintain a fixed exchange rate against any currency until 
1993.  
 
In March 1992, the authorities closed the peg to a basket of currencies and announced a 
dual exchange rate system that reflected a free market quote as well as an official quote 
of  the  rupee  against  the  US  dollar.  Though  the  peg  to  a  basket  of  currencies  with 
undisclosed weights ended, ambiguity still persisted because of duality in the exchange 
rate.  The World Bank (1997) considers this attempt an experiment by the Indian central 
bank, the reserve bank of India (RBI). The official rates very often differed from the 
market rates  and created lot of inefficiency along with a corresponding black market 
(World Bank, 1997). This system could not last long and came to a close in February 
1993. 
 
In March 1993, the central bank approved an explicit and unified rate determined by 
market forces. There was, it turned out, a great deal of intervention in the market. Calvo 
and Reinhart (2000) found that the ‘float’ (of India) was extensively managed between 
1993  and  1999  to  achieve  nominal  and  real  exchange  rate  stability  despite  policy 
ostensibly meant to allow the rupee to float.  Kohli (2003) asserts that the central bank 
endeavored  to  lean  against  the  wind  from  1993  to  1999.  Acharya  (2001),  as  a 
policymaker, admits that the exchange rate system had been managed as long as the stress 
from the East Asian flu lasted until December 1998.   
 
Thus, starting in 1993, no official peg prevailed, but the authorities clearly attempted to 
maintain  a  steady  and  stable  exchange  rate  against  the  US  dollar.  However,  the 
authorities failed to achieve that stability until the Asian crisis has been over in 1998. 
Indian  markets of  money  and the  foreign  exchange  encountered  a  series  of  turbulent 
events between 1993 and 1997.  The first problem India faced after the reform was the 
foreign  capital  surge  of  1993-1994  that  left  appreciating  pressure  on  the  rupee.  But 
“despite contrary advice from the IMF, India decided to build up reserves and not permit 
the nominal rupee-dollar parity to appreciate” (Acharya, 2001).  In August 1995, there 
was unexpected turbulence in the foreign exchange market. To prevent panic reactions to 
this unfamiliar variability the RBI intervened with substantial dollar sales. 
 
Though the foreign capital surge was over by 1996, the Asian crisis hit the market. In 
July 1997, the Thai baht depreciated massively and ushered in the East Asian financial 
crisis,
4  which  had  worldwide  repercussions.  Indian  markets  of  money  and  foreign 
exchange were subject to repeated bouts of speculative pressure until the mid 1998. The 
IMF  asserts  the  end  of  the  Asian  crisis  by  May  1998  (Fischer  1998).  But  India 
experienced  volatility  in  the  markets  of  money  and  the  exchange  rate  till  June  1998 
                                                 
4 The currencies of the neighboring countries such as Indonesia and Malaysia went under speculative attack 
as well.  The overvaluation of currencies, inflated asset pricing, crony capitalism, and enormous short-term 
foreign debts are seen as the major causes of the crisis.  The experience of the Asian crisis has underlined 
the weakness in the international financial architecture in coping with sudden panics and massive swings in 
cross-border flows of capital. International Conference on Globalization and Its Discontents, Cortland, 2007 
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(Jones 1998). In June 1998, India’s exchange rate came all-time low following India’s 
nuclear tests in May 1998. The exchange rate began to stabilize since July 1998. Figure 1 
confirms that as well. 
 
Thus, India experienced different exchange rate policies since independence. They are 
basically: (i) a fixed exchange rate under a well-defined peg until the mid 1970s, (ii) a 
floating exchange rate under a peg to a basket of currencies with undisclosed weights 
from the mid 1970s to the early 1990s, (iii) an unstable exchange rate under a managed 
peg from liberalization to the Asian crisis, and finally (iv) a stable exchange rate in the 
post-Asian-crisis period. Considering the implications of the exchange rate, which are 
important in our study, we can combine the troubled period under (iii) with the period 
under (ii), and form a new period where the exchange rate were by and large floating and 
unstable. 
 
Now, we can broadly define Regimes 1, 2 and 3 for India. Regime 1 covers the Bretton 
Woods system along with the dollar peg and the sterling peg. It lasted till September 
1975.  Despite devaluation in 1966 and some fluctuations during the first oil shock, the 
Indian rupee was pegged to either the dollar or sterling in a transparent way in Regime 1. 
Regime 2 with floating or an unstable exchange rate ranges from October 1975 to June 
1998.  The remaining period from July 1998 to March 2005 forms Regime 3.  
 
Monetary Policy Tools of the Indian Central Bank: 
 
In  order  to  examine  the  monetary-policy  link  between  the  leading  economy  and  the 
developing country, we need to find the indicator of monetary policy in each country. For 
the US case, the most useful tool for the Federal Reserve Bank is the Fed funds rate, and 
hence the Fed rate, which is the credible indicator of the monetary-policy stance. On the 
other hand, it is necessary to understand some aspects of Indian financial market structure 
and the role of the reserve bank of India (RBI) before we decide on its monetary-policy 
stance.   
 
Before independence, India developed active financial markets in short-term marketable 
debt, as well as commercial banks, corporate bonds and equity markets. The Bombay call 
money rate, and henceforth the call rate, was the inter-bank interest rate at which one 
bank could borrow money from other banks. The borrowing bank had to return the fund 
at the ‘call’ of the lending bank.   
 
To influence financial markets and economic activity, the RBI had two classic tools of 
central bank policy: a rate of discount on lending to commercial banks, and open market 
operations (OMO). In India, the former was known as the ‘Bank Rate’ at which the RBI 
was prepared to buy or rediscount bills of exchange. In addition, the RBI widely used two 
types of reserve requirements: cash reserve ratio (CRR) and statutory reserve ratio (SLR). 
The CRR specifies the proportion of deposits that a bank must hold in cash. The SLR 
stipulates  the  proportion  of the  deposit  that  banks  must  invest  mainly  in  government 
securities. 
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Until  1997,  a  persistent  problem  faced  by  the  RBI  was  deficit  financing  of  the 
government.  The  RBI  had  to  monetize  whatever  deficit  the  government  would  have 
incurred.  The central bank could not counter this with OMO’s. To counteract the effect 
of deficit caused by high-powered money (HPM) growth the RBI made extensive use of 
changes  in  reserve  requirements.    In  addition  to these  correctional  tools of  monetary 
policy, the RBI and other government agencies made extensive use of direct controls on 
interest rates and commercial bank lending mainly since the early 1970s following the 
nationalization  of  the  commercial  banks  in  1969.  The  regulations  were  substantially 
liberalized in the second half of the 1980s, and were eliminated following the economic 
reform in the early 1990s. 
 
Because of the importance of reserve requirement changes and direct controls, changes in 
the Bank Rate  and HPM  growth  may not be  good indicators of the stance of  Indian 
monetary policy. Outside the whole 1980 when the call rate was controlled, changes in 
the call rate are perhaps the best indicator of monetary policy. The experience in India 
has been that the call rate has a pervasive influence on all interest rates in the country.  It 
would not be wrong to say that the call rate is the true benchmark rate of interest in the 
Indian economy (Varma, 1997).
5  In any event, the interbank rate of interest would be of 
significance for the RBI, since it provides informational content of the state of liquidity 
and financial intermediation (Vasudevan, 1997). 
 
Restricted Trade and Limited Capital Mobility in India 
 
India allowed limited capital mobility after independence. The country escalated import 
controls after the foreign exchange crisis of 1957. Since then there have been periods of 
severe tightening (1957-62 and 1968-74) and moderate relaxation (1966-68, 1975-79, and 
1982-89) depending on the state of the foreign exchange reserves (Joshi and Little, 1994). 
The main instrument of import control has been the import licensing system. Imports 
were, of course, also subject to tariffs, which in some cases were well over 100 percent. 
Accordingly, the effective rate of protection was around 100 percent in 1969, and 70 
percent  in  the  mid  1980s.
6    The  export  sector  experienced  a  haphazard  system  of 
subsidies.  The  principal  means  of  subsidization  had  been  cash  assistance,  duty 
drawbacks, and preferential treatment for some imports.  India’s exports as a share of its 
GDP were about four percent in 1961, and it remained almost four percent even in 1986. 
In 2005, it has reached to thirteen percent. 
 
Historically,  the  international  mobility  of  capital  has  been  low  in  India  (Haque  and 
Montiel, 1990), and this was even lower in Regime 1. Despite low volume, there were 
some  capital  flows  in  the  form  of  banking  capital,
7  corporate  capital  and  foreign 
                                                 
5 The RBI Bulletin historically published the call rate in ‘India’s leading indicators’.  Conducting the 
indicator analysis for India, Chitre (2001) used the call rate.  Other studies that used the call rate include 
Ansari and Gang (1999), and Kar and Sarkar (2005). 
6 As calculated by Bhagwati and Srinivasan (1975), and the World Bank (1987), respectively. 
7 Banking capital comprises foreign assets and liabilities of commercial banks.  Foreign assets consist of (i) 
foreign currency holdings, and (ii) rupee overdrafts to non-resident banks.  Foreign liabilities consist of (i) 
non-resident  deposits,  and  (ii)  liabilities  other  than  non-resident  deposits  which  comprises  rupee  and 
foreign currency liabilities to non-resident banks and official and semi-official institutions.  Additionally, International Conference on Globalization and Its Discontents, Cortland, 2007 
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investments.
8 Interest-rate differential (IRD) used to influence these capital flows. From 
1959 to 1961, for example,
9 there were continuous inflows of banking capital. The inflow 
during 1963 took place against the background of a return to lower interest rates in the 
U.K.,  tighter  market  conditions  for  funds  in  India.  The  RBI  (1963)  explicitly  stated, 
“Movements in banking capital are closely related to changes in relative interest rates in 
India compared to rates abroad, principally in the U.K., as also the general demand and 
supply condition for funds.” 
 
The RBI routinely monitored US discount rates. For example, the RBI report discussed 
the gradual increase in the US discount rate during the 1960s.
10 Accordingly, India’s call 
rate rose as well. The report asserts, “The emergence of interest-rate differential (IRD) 
over the decade has been an important factor in the movements of short-term funds”. It 
also revealed that the international corporations had become another circuit for short-term 
funds. The international enterprises looked upon foreign credits as a substitute for or a 
complement  to  the  credit  facilities  available  in  the  domestic  markets  of  India.  The 
authorities tried to attract foreign investment by advocating a higher rate of return on 
investment. They claimed
11 that the average rate of return in India on the US and the U.K. 
investment was marginally higher than that on domestic investment in the US and the 
U.K. All these were the driving forces that induced Indian authorities to closely maintain 
a stable IRD with the external rates
12 while the RBI has always been poised on foreign 
exchange constraints until liberalization.  
 
Equation (ii) in our model requires the CB to care about capital flows and net exports in 
the  face  of  foreign  exchange  constraints.  The  RBI  authorities  were  cautious
13  about 
capital flows and net exports position while foreign-exchange shortage was a common 
problem  at  least  until  the  early  1990s.  Acharya  (2001)  asserts  that  before  the  1990s 
‘foreign  exchange  shortage’  was  the  foundation  on  which  a  rickety  structure  of  bad 
economic policy was built. Joshi and Little (1994) reconfirm that the balance of payment 
position had been fragile ever since the foreign exchange crisis in 1957.  
 
 
                                                                                                                                                  
banking capital include movement in balances of foreign central banks and international institutions like 
IBRD, IDA, ADB, IFC, and IFAD maintained with the RBI (RBI Bulletin, October 2006, p. S931). 
8 Portraying a picture of foreign investment in India in the 1960s, the RBI governor advocated, “Getting 
into the Indian economy now as producers, gives foreign investors the opportunity of getting in on the 
ground floor in the progress of the Indian economy. Hundreds of new foreign investment and collaboration 
agreements have been signed in the last few years.” (Bhattacharyya, 1966) 
9 RBI Bulletin, July 1963, p. 902. 
10 RBI Bulletin, August 1970, p. 1374. 
11 RBI Bulletin, May 1966, p. 510. 
12 Vuyyuri (2004) found a steady-state relationship of short-term interest rates in India with both the US 
and Japan. 
13The fact that there have been no speculative capital outflows nor has the change adversely affected the 
competitive  position  of  our  exports  in  the  ultimate  proof  that  the  multi-currency  peg  has  served  us 
reasonably well (Narasimham, RBI Bulletin 6/77:430). International Conference on Globalization and Its Discontents, Cortland, 2007 
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Figure  2  confirms  that  India’s  foreign  exchange  constraint  was  most  acute  until  the 
reform.
14 Thus, in the face of foreign exchange constraints, India cautiously monitored 
capital flows and net exports position. That situation, as equation (ii) suggests, induced 
Indian authorities to maintain a stable IRD with external interest rates. 
 
Background of Globalization in India 
 
The economic policy of  India tilted to socialist bias even before its independence of 
1947.
15  As a result, planned industrialization along with import substitution was the 
major policy tool both to save foreign exchange and increase economic independence 
over the longer run. The Industries Development and Regulation Act of 1951 introduced 
a system of licensing to control the pace and pattern of industrial development across the 
country,  which  became  known  as  ‘License  Raj’.  An  industrial  license  was  mainly 
required to (i) establish a new factory, (ii) expand an existing capacity, (iii) start a new 
product line, or (iv) change location.  In 1969, the Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi 
announced the nationalization of domestically owned commercial banks. The  Foreign 
Exchange Regulation Act (FERA) was passed in 1973,
16 controlling foreign investment 
in India in a comprehensive manner.  An array of regulatory measures was added on to an 
already over-regulated economy.  
 
The  expansionary  policies  in  the  first  half  of  the  1980s  combined  with  modest 
liberalization led to faster growth. The liberalizing measures of the Gandhi government 
from 1985 to 1990 were directed to the deregulation of industrial and trade policy. The 
consolidated government’s fiscal deficit, which was about five percent of GDP in the mid 
1970s, rose persistently to reach about ten percent of GDP at the end of the 1980s (Joshi 
and Little, 1994). Given the unsound macroeconomic position before the Gulf war, the 
mini oil shock led to a rapid deterioration of the capital account. Agarwal (2003) asserts 
that  India  faced  its  worst  financial  crisis  in  1991.  To  contain  the  crisis  and  restore 
economic health, the new Congress government announced a package of policies what 
we frequently refer to as ‘reform’ or ‘liberalization’ of India in the early 1990s (Acharya, 
2001).   
 
                                                 
14 The adoption of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act (FERA) 1973 reflects the background of foreign 
exchange constraint. India had the FERA in place in 1957 to regulate the inflow of foreign capital.  After 
initiation of a process of rapid industrialization of the country, the need to conserve foreign currency was 
keenly  felt.  Exports  were  not  picking  up  and imports  were  surging,  putting  the  country  into  a severe 
balance of payments crisis. In this background the government redesigned the old act and named the new 
one as the FERA 1973 with the main aim of conservation of foreign exchange rather than regulation of 
entry  of  foreign  capital  (FERA  1973,  see  http://www.geocities.com/kstability/learning/forex-
market/fema.html). 
15 Jawaharlal Nehru, the first Prime Minister of India, and the Congress Party’s Planning Commission 
(1951) were strongly influenced by the democratic socialism of the British Fabians, as well as the apparent 
Soviet success in achieving rapid industrial growth and political power. In addition, the Great Depression 
of the 1930s resulted in disillusionment with capitalism.  There was also a fear of ‘economic imperialism’ 
replacing political imperialism if India encouraged foreign investment and trade dependency (Rosen, 1997).  
See Visveswarya (1934) and Nehru (1946) for detail.  
16 A short discussion along with the background of the FERA has been presented later in section IV.  International Conference on Globalization and Its Discontents, Cortland, 2007 
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The reform mainly involved freeing of industrial investment and the trade sector. The 
government dismantled the License Raj and encouraged foreign investments. The heavy 
anti-export bias in the trade and payments regime was reduced by a phased reduction in 
tariffs.  Short-term  debt  was  reduced  as  well.  Foreign  exchange  reserves  were 
accumulated to provide greater insurance against external uncertainties. The government 
moved  from  a  pro-business  stance  in  the  1980s  to  a  pro-market  stance  in  the  1990s 
(Rodrick and Subramanian, 2004).   
 
India  approved  current  account  convertibility  in  1994  and  gradually  moving  towards 
capital account convertibility. Though India initiated liberalization in the early 1990s, 
current account convertibility in the mid 1990s is considered to be a milestone in its 
liberalization process.  More precisely, India entered a period of higher capital flows after 
the  Asian  crisis.    Accordingly,  we  will  refer  to  the  post-Asian-crisis  period  as 
globalization in India. 
 
Hypotheses on Monetary-Policy Independence across Exchange-Rate Regimes 
 
Here we want to assess the nature of the interest-rate movement between two countries 




Regime 1 can be characterized by imperfect capital mobility with a fixed exchange rate. 
We learned in section II that in the face of foreign exchange constraints India cautiously 
monitored capital flows and net exports position and tried to track foreign interest rate, as 
equation (ii) suggests. Figure 3 shows how the call rate roughly tracked the movement of 
the Fed Funds rate in Regime 1.
17 If we regress the call rate on the Fed Funds rate, we 
expect to see a significant rate co-movement in India’s call rate in response to the Fed 




Regime 2 can be characterized by the case of imperfect capital mobility with a floating 
exchange rate. In contrast to Regime 1, here the floating exchange rate does not constrain 
the  country’s  monetary  policy  and  thus  the  interest  rate  is  not  restrained  either. 
Accordingly, maintaining a stable interest-rate differential between the two countries is 
unlikely to prevail. Figure 4 shows how the call rate and the Fed Funds rate moved in 
Regime 2. Visual inspection suggests a collapse in rate co-movement between the two 





                                                 
17 A temporary deviation in the wake of the great devaluation in 1966 was also endorsed by theory.  We 
learned  that  devaluation  raises  net  exports  and  the  interest  rate  needed  to  maintain  the  exchange  rate 
declines. International Conference on Globalization and Its Discontents, Cortland, 2007 
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Regime 3: 
 
Regime 3 falls under the reform where capital mobility has been more liberalized than 
ever before. We know that India approved current account convertibility in 1994. The 
country  is  gradually  moving  towards  capital  account  convertibility  in  recent  years. 
Accordingly, capital flows are larger than that in Regime 1 or 2, but less than perfect. The 
exchange rate can be assumed as fixed as it is stable by design. Indian authorities still 
care  about  reserve  gain.  These  circumstances  involve  the  concepts  of  equation  (ii), 
interest-rate parity, and the impossible trinity argument while predicting the relation of 
interest rate between the US and India. Indian interest rates are likely to synchronize with 
those of the US in Regime 3. 
 
Figure 5 shows that India poses a spectacularly stable interest-rate differential with the 
US in  Regime  3. The  purpose of  India’s stable  exchange  rate is to  maintain  foreign 
currency reserves at a safe level and thereby avoid any crisis in future. For example, if 
India  raises  the  interest  rate  much  higher  than  that  of  the  U.S.,  the  country  will  be 
swamped with capital inflows. A sudden surge in capital inflows will push the rupee to a 
higher notch, but this appreciation will harm its exports.  In addition, the stronger rupee 
will  stimulate  its  imports.  This  trend  will  worsen  the  current  account  balance  and 
eventually cause another balance of payment crisis. That is why Indian authorities are 
more committed to maintain exchange-rate stability that requires maintaining a stable 
interest-rate differential as the corollary to the interest rate parity. 
 
Testing Hypotheses on Monetary-Policy Independence across Exchange-Rate Regimes:  
 
Here we intend to work with monthly data in order to test the hypotheses we developed 
earlier. The main reason to work with monthly data is twofold: (i) we can closely focus 
on different segments of the entire period with sufficient data points, and (ii) we can 
examine the behavior of India’s interest rate across different regimes. As we want to see 
how Indian interest rates move in response to US interest rates, we need to collect interest 
rates of both countries. We collect most of our data from the official website of the RBI, 
and  from  different  volumes  of  the  ‘Monthly  Abstract  of  Statistics,’  published  by  the 
Government of India. We described sources of our dataset in detail in the appendix. We 
start our exercise in 1961 fiscal year, because the call rate, being one of our vital series, 
first  appeared  as  a  weighted  average  figure  in  1961  fiscal  year  on  both  annual  and 
monthly basis.
18  Indian fiscal year ranges from April to March. Accordingly, our data 
ranges from April 1960 to March 2005. We collect the US Fed rate from the website of 
the St. Louis Fed Reserve. 
 
Before we regress the call rate on the Fed rate, we need to consider other factors, which 
are thought to affect India’s call rate. The factors that are arguably influential to the call 
rate include Indian monsoons, wars, and the global oil shocks. Out of them the influence 
of wars and oil shocks is somewhat clear, because they usually lead to higher interest rate 
in the money market. But the influence of monsoons on interest rate could be ambiguous. 
                                                 
18 Statistical Abstract India 1962, p. 450, for annual, and Reserve Bank of India Bulletin January 1961, p. 
99, for monthly figures. International Conference on Globalization and Its Discontents, Cortland, 2007 
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It is likely that investment demand may fall causing a drop in interest rate in the wake of 
a bad monsoon, and vice versa. We expect to see a positive relation between monsoons 
and India’s interest rate. The studies showing the monsoon-effect on India’s agricultural 
growth  include  Mooley  et  al  (1981),  Mooley  and  Pant  (1981),  and  Mooley  and 
Parthasarathy (1982).  
 
We  indexed  monsoon  rainfall  data
19  by  assigning  100  to  853  millimeters  of  annual 
precipitation, which is thought to be the long period average (LPA) of annual rainfall in 
India.
20  We  also  took  the  deviation  from  that  LPA  in  percentage  value to  derive  the 
‘monsoon’ variable. As we go by India’s fiscal year, the monsoon rainfall of 1961 means 
the annual precipitation that took place from June to September 1960. The monsoon-
dependent agricultural crops return to the peasants by January or February. We, therefore, 
expect to see the some effect of the monsoon in the same fiscal year, and greater effect in 
the following fiscal year. 
 
Now we consider another regressor, namely ‘war and Gandhi,’ which includes three wars 
and two assassinations of Indira Gandhi and Rajiv Gandhi. India had one war with China 
(1962),  and  two  wars  with  Pakistan  (1965  and  1971).  India  experienced  three 
assassinations of: (i) Mahatma Gandhi in 1948, (ii) Indira Gandhi in 1984, and (iii) Rajiv 
Gandhi in 1991. Our sample covers the later two incidences.  Though the wars and the 
assassinations are not similar in effect, we combined them to make one dummy variable 
in order to mean war or warlike situations. Wars and warlike situations raise government 
spending causing an interest-rate hike in the market.   
 
Finally, ‘oil shocks’ capture the major oil shocks in 1973 and 1979, which had global 
repercussions and raised the cost of fund. The energy crisis following the oil embargo by 
the oil exporting countries created supply-side shocks and inflation in all oil importing 
countries like India. Authorities are expected to raise interest rate in the wake of the oil 
shocks in order to combat inflation. Overall we expect to see a rise in the interest rate 
following the oil shocks.  
 
Ansari and Gang (1999) claim that an unanticipated shock in foreign interest rates seems 
to  have  produced  a  positive  impact  on  domestic  interest  rates  in  the  following  three 
months. We will test the contemporaneous effect of the Fed rate on the call rate. In order 
to test our hypothesis, we regress the call rate on a constant, the Fed Funds rate with lags 
from zero to three, the call rate with a lag of twelve,
21 ‘monsoon’ with a lag of twelve,
22 
‘war and Gandhi’, and finally ‘oil shocks’. The specification becomes: 
                                                 
19 The ‘monsoon rainfall’ data has been collected from Parthasarathy at el (1995) and the website of the 
Indian Institute of Tropical Meteorology (IITM) at http://www.tropmet.res.in   
20 Indian Institute of Tropical Meteorology states it on 
http://www.tropmet.res.in/~koli/MOL/Monsoon/Historical/air.html  
21 The monthly observation of the call rate by the RBI always mentions the call rate that existed twelve months ago, as 
a point of reference to see the changes on annual basis by netting out seasonality if any.  Accordingly, we put a lag of 
twelve on call rate.   
22
 We find that the lag of twelve months on ‘monsoon’ is an effective one in regressing the call rate on it.  ‘Monsoon’ 
is an annual rainfall figure what we have assigned against all months from June to May (monsoon year).  Accordingly, 
any lag of twelve covers a period that can capture the rainfall effect from the last year or the year before.  International Conference on Globalization and Its Discontents, Cortland, 2007 
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(v) 
t t t t t i t i t oil Gandhi and war monsoon rate call rate fed rate call e q q q q b a + + + + + + = - - - 4 3 12 2 12 1 _ _ _ _ _ ,  
i = 0,1,2,or 3   
Regime 1: 
 
We have already assessed the implications on interest rate of India in response to the Fed 
rate, under three different regimes. We now begin our work with Regime 1 in order to 
test the implications. The estimation results following specification (v) appear in Table 1 
under  Regime  1  that  includes  Regressions  1  to  4.  The  four  regressions  clearly 
demonstrate that the Fed rate significantly influences the call rate. The coefficients on 




There is no significant co-movement in India’s interest rate under Regime 2. All four 
regressions (5 to 8 in Table 1) show that all the coefficients on the Fed rate with lags 
from zero to three are highly insignificant. The signs on the coefficients are awkwardly 
negative as well. A floating exchange rate is coupled with the loss of the interest-rate 
dependence  in  India.  Simply,  India  is  liberty  to  set  its  interest  rate  without  being 
influenced by the US counterpart.  The coefficients on monsoons, and war and Gandhi 
are positive and significant as expected, though the coefficients on oil shocks become 




Regime  3,  as  we  predicted  before,  is  supposed  to  generate  results  similar  to  that  of 
Regime 1. The results, as shown by the four estimations (9 to 12 in Table 1) evidence a 
stronger emergence of India’s rate co-movement with the US. All the coefficients on the 
Fed rate are strongly positive and higher than those under Regime 1. The R
2 against all 
lags are as good as those in Regime 1. Thus, we claim that a stable exchange rate is 
contributing to the high rate co-movement of India with the US. India’s monetary-policy 




This  paper  examines  whether  globalization  causes  the  loss  of  monetary-policy 
independence in developing economies. By using Indian data in our case study we find 
that globalization does not necessarily cause the loss of monetary-policy independence. A 
country  with  foreign  exchange  constraint  may  lose  its  monetary-policy  independence 
even in the absence of globalization under limited capital flows as long as it attempts to 
maintain a fixed or a stable exchange rate. This was the case in the 1960s when India 
controlled capital flows, maintained a fixed exchange rate, and Indian interest rates used 
to  follow  US  interest  rates  in  a  significant  way.  In  contrast,  a  country  can  exercise 
monetary-policy  independence  even  under  free  capital  flows  as  long  as  it  does  not 
maintain a stable exchange rate. Thus, monetary-policy independence is more anchored 
in  the  nature  of  the  exchange-rate  regime  along  with  the  state  of  foreign-exchange 
constraint, and not necessarily in globalization per se. International Conference on Globalization and Its Discontents, Cortland, 2007 
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Our findings raise a number of issues. What would be a cost-benefit analysis for the loss 
of monetary-policy independence in the age of globalization? Can countries like India 
sustain a stable exchange rate by confronting greater capital inflows? What would be an 
optimal amount of reserve gain for a developing economy? All these aspects are left for 
future research. International Conference on Globalization and Its Discontents, Cortland, 2007 
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Figure 3: India’s call money rates and US Fed funds rates in Regime 1  










Figure 4: India’s call money rates and US Fed funds rates in Regime 2 














Figure 5: India’s call money rates and US Fed funds rates in Regime 3 
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Fed Rate            
(t)
Fed Rate            
(t-1)
Fed Rate            
(t-2)
Fed Rate            
(t-3)
Call Rate       
(t-12)




Oil Shocks          
(t) R
2 
1 Regime 1 1.7998 0.1636 0.5708 -0.0008 0.9710 7.5528 0.71
Apr 1960 - Sep 1975 (1.5156) (0.0712) (0.0485) (0.0017) (0.4217) (0.6447)
[0.24] [0.02] [0.00] [0.65] [0.02] [0.00]
2 1.4428 0.2166 0.5599 -0.0006 1.0209 7.2799 0.72
(1.4742) (0.0694) (0.0481) (0.0017) (0.4168) (0.6356)
[0.33] [0.00] [0.00] [0.72] [0.02] [0.00]
3 1.0759 0.2820 0.5406 -0.0004 1.0822 6.9616 0.73
(1.4203) (0.0671) (0.0476) (0.0016) (0.4080) (0.6181)
[0.45] [0.00] [0.00] [0.79] [0.01] [0.00]
4 0.6827 0.3427 0.5116 -0.0001 1.1108 6.7168 0.74
(1.3731) (0.0645) (0.0472) (0.0016) (0.3964) (0.5935)
[0.62] [0.00] [0.00] [0.93] [0.01] [0.00]
5 Regime 2 -3.9992 -0.1246 0.2906 0.0144 2.5398 0.8828 0.20
Oct 1975 - Jun 1998 (3.1403) (0.0846) (0.0622) (0.0034) (1.3106) (1.1266)
[0.20] [0.14] [0.00] [0.00] [0.05] [0.43]
6 -4.2865 -0.1132 0.2940 0.0146 2.5415 0.7944 0.19
(3.1036) (0.0838) (0.0620) (0.0034) (1.3116) (1.1178)
[0.17] [0.18] [0.00] [0.00] [0.05] [0.48]
7 -4.6373 -0.0856 0.3022 0.0147 2.5481 0.6969 0.19
(3.1037) (0.0834) (0.0620) (0.0034) (1.3146) (1.1157)
[0.14] [0.31] [0.00] [0.00] [0.05] [0.53]
8 -4.8541 -0.0675 0.3075 0.0147 2.5544 0.6351 0.19
(3.1068) (0.0831) (0.0619) (0.0034) (1.3173) (1.1134)
[0.12] [0.42] [0.00] [0.00] [0.05] [0.57]
9 Regime 3 0.7223 0.8389 0.2393 0.0020 0.72
Jul 1998 - Mar 2005 (2.2564) (0.1064) (0.0511) (0.0029)
[0.75] [0.00] [0.00] [0.50]
10 -0.1659 0.8079 0.2332 0.0032 0.72
(2.2266) (0.1049) (0.0521) (0.0029)
[0.94] [0.00] [0.00] [0.26]
11 -1.0243 0.7768 0.2240 0.0045 0.71
(2.2242) (0.1053) (0.0539) (0.0028)
[0.65] [0.00] [0.00] [0.12]
12 -1.6710 0.7648 0.2125 0.0054 0.71
(2.1926) (0.1046) (0.0549) (0.0028)
[0.45] [0.00] [0.00] [0.06]
Note: Standard error is inside ( ), and p-value is inside [ ] under each coefficient. The coefficients of interest are in bold when they are significant.International Conference on Globalization and Its Discontents, Cortland, 2007 
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